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Abstract:  
The presence of conflict affects people’s economic incentives. Some sectors of activity flourish, 
while  others  suffer.  For  understanding  structural  problems  in  developing  countries  and 
designing appropriate post-conflict reconstruction policies, it is essential to understand in what 
ways conflict affects the structure of the economy. 
We develop a simple model of conflict and multiple sectors of activity, where conflict efforts, the 
allocation of factor endowments and the production outputs are endogenous. We predict that for 
moderately destructive conflicts labor-intensive sectors are most affected by fighting, while for 
highly destructive conflicts capital-intensive sectors suffer most. In the latter case, under some 
conditions it is also possible that – in the presence of endogenous conflict - an increase in the 
price  of  the  capital-intensive  commodity  reduces  the  output  of  this  same  good.  The  model 
further  predicts  that  export-sectors  and  sectors  that  require  inter-temporal  investments  are 
particularly exposed to conflict activity. 
In the empirical part of the paper, we study the impact of various forms of conflict, separately 
and as an aggregate conflict index constructed with principal component analysis. We present 
some basic stylized facts about the effect of conflict on the productive structure of the economy. 
Conflict reduces the share of the manufacturing sector in the GDP, increases the exploitation of 
some simple natural resources (i.e. forestry) and reduces the production of crops.  
Using industrial level data for developing countries we study the channels through which conflict 
affects  the  manufacturing  sector.  As  expected,  we  find  that  industries  that  are  more 
institutional/transaction intensive are the ones that suffer most in conflictive societies. Labor-
intensive sectors are also negatively affected by conflict. It is also found that exporting industries 
and sectors requiring external financing suffer more during conflict. Our results are robust to 
sensitivity analysis. 
Keywords: Conflict, Production Structure, Resource Curse, Post-Conflict Reconstruction. 
JEL Classification: D74, O13, O14. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Nicaragua and Costa Rica are neighboring countries that share the same colonial past, 
the  same  Independence  Day,  the  same  language,  and  a  similar  geography  and  resource 
endowment. Fifty years ago their level of development was similar. However, nowadays, Costa 
Rica’s per capita GDP is approximately five times larger than Nicaragua’s. Costa Rica ranks 
48
th in the Human Development Index, while Nicaragua ranks 110
th. Their productive structures 
also  reflex  their  divergent  development  path.  Electronics,  pharmaceuticals,  financial 
outsourcing, software development, and ecotourism have become the prime industries in Costa 
Rica's economy. In contrast, the Nicaraguan economy is still basically agrarian and based on 
the production and export of cash crops such as bananas, coffee, sugar, and tobacco. What are 
the reasons for such a divergent path? While it is hard to point out only one factor, probably part 
of the explanation comes from the fact that in the last 50 years Costa Rica has enjoyed greater 
peace and more consistent political stability than Nicaragua, that went through a long period of 
dictatorships, the Sandinista rebellion during the 1970s and the Contra War during the 1980s. 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of conflict on the production structure of 
the economy. Our hypothesis is that civil conflict is one of the underlying reasons for structural 
economic problems in poor countries. Of course, we also recognize that more underdeveloped 
economies have a higher propensity to suffer conflicts due to the lower opportunity cost. We are 
aware of this endogeneity and perverse dynamics. In this paper, we emphasize the part of the 
relationship that has been less studied, i.e. how conflicts shape the development path. Civil 
wars lead to a poorly-developed manufacturing sector that does not allow for the incorporation 
of low-skilled workers, which increases inequality. It also leads to the under-exploitation of some 
natural  resources  and  the  over-exploitation  of  others,  what  could  lead  to  environmental 
degradation and increasing poverty. 
 
  This study is mostly empirical. After building a simple formal model that highlights the 
various channels through which conflict matters, we construct indices of conflict using different 
measures of socio-political instability. With the help of principal components analysis they are 
combined in a single index. Some basic stylized facts of the effect of conflict on the productive 
structure of the economy are then presented. We find that conflict reduces the share of the   4 
manufacturing sector in the GDP, increases the exploitation of some simple natural resources 
(forestry) and reduces the production of crops. We find inconclusive evidence on the effects of 
conflict on the share of the agricultural and service sector in the GDP. 
 
  We  subsequently  focus  on  explaining  the  observed  negative  association  between 
conflicts and manufacturing growth. Using industrial level data for developing countries we study 
the channels through which conflict may affect the manufacturing sector. This dataset allows 
within  country,  between  industries  differences,  beyond  the  traditional  between  country 
differences of the cross-countries studies. As expected, we find that industries that are more 
institutional/transaction intensive are the ones that suffer the most in more conflictive societies. 
Surprisingly,  we  find  that  labor-intensive  industries  rather  than  the  capital-intensive  ones 
experience the worst outcomes in more conflictive countries. We present several explanations 
for this result, which is at odd with previous findings of Collier (1999). Further, we also find that 
exporting industries and those sectors requiring external financing suffer more during conflict. 
Our results are robust to sensitivity analysis. 
 
  This paper relates to three branches of the economics literature. The first branch is the 
literature on instability and growth using cross-countries regressions. Barro (1991) and Alesina 
et  al  (1996)  find  that  greater  instability  lowers  the  growth  rate  of  a  country.  The  inverse 
relationship also seems to exist. Londregan and Poole (1990) find that lower economic growth 
increases instability, while Miguel et al (2004) conclude that low growth rates result in a higher 
risk of civil wars. In contrast, Alesina et al (1996) find that this effect is only important for Coups 
d’Etat. Alesina and Perotti (1995), using a composite index for instability, test a channel for the 
inverse  relationship  between  income  inequality  and  growth:  income  inequality  fuels  social 
discontent and increase socio political instability, this creates uncertainty reducing investment 
and therefore growth.  
 
This paper also relates to the literature on the economics of civil war. While numerous 
papers focus on the causes of war, only a few papers study the economic effects of conflict. 
Collier  (1999)  distinguishes  four  different  economic  effects  of  civil  war:  diversion  of  public 
resources from productive activities to violence, time horizons shortened leading to opportunistic   5 
behavior,  lost  of  human  and  financial  capital,  and  a  shift  away  from  vulnerable  economic 
activities towards those that are less vulnerable. Rohner (2006) shows that conflict can lead to 
under-exploitation  of  renewable  natural  resources  and  over-exploitation  of  resources  with 
negative future externalities.  
 
From the methodological point of view, our paper is also related to the literature initiated 
by  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  emphasizing  the  comparison  of  different  industries  within 
countries. 
 
  Most of the empirical studies assessing the economic effects of conflict only focus on 
aggregate measures of instability and growth. Collier (1999) is one exception. He uses national 
account  data for  Uganda  before  and  after  the social  disturbance that started  in  1972  when 
President Idi Amin declared “economic war” against the resident Asian community. He finds 
important changes in the composition of economic activity that he attributes to the conflict. To 
our  knowledge,  our  paper  is  the  first  to  study  systematically  the  effects  of  conflict  on  the 
production structure of a country using industrial level data for a large cross section of countries. 
Given  the  important  economic  effects  of  conflict,  our  findings  are  important  for  the 
understanding of post conflict dynamics, the kind of policies needed to reduce the risk of further 




  The  rest  of  this  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  we  provide  a  brief 
discussion of the definition and estimation of our measure of conflict. In section 3, we describe 
our data and sample period. In section 4, we derive theoretical predictions of the effects of 
conflict  on  the  economy  and  provide  in  section  5  some  stylized  effects  of  conflict  on  the 
structure of the economy using our sample of developing countries. In section 6 of the paper, 
we present and estimate some plausible channels through which conflict affects the production 
structure of the economy and in section 7 we conclude. 
                                                           
1 It may also have policy implications on how post conflict aid should be allocated. According to the new 
regulations, at least 10% of the IDA budget should be allocated to post conflict countries.    6 
 
 
2.  Definition and Measurement of Conflict 
 
  We shall not focus only on civil wars like most of the literature, but take into account 
other dimensions of conflict, such as coups and politically motivated assassinations, leading to 
political and social instability.  
 
  The keen interest in political science and economics for understanding the causes of 
civil conflicts has led to the development of several datasets, using diverse sources, and trying 
to capture several dimensions of the phenomena, such as duration, intensity and location. This 
wealth  of  information  leads  to  the  practical  problem  of  how  to  define  conflict  and  how  to 
measure  it.  Hibbs  (1973)  was  one  of  the  first  to  notice  this  problem  and  suggested  to 
concentrate  on  six  components  of  political  violence:  riots,  anti-government  demonstrations, 
political strikes, armed-attack events, and deaths from group violence. 
 
  Following this pioneering work we decided to narrow our definition of conflict looking to 
the  following  five  categories:  number  of  politically  motivated  murder  of  government  officials 
(Banks 2008), numbers of coups (Banks 2008), a dummy variable for civil war onsets (PRIO 
dataset, cf. Gleditsch et al 2002), the number of deaths in civil wars as a proportion of the 
population  (Gleditsch  et  al  2002)  and  the  democracy/autocracy  index  (Polity  IV  project 
summarized in Marshall and Jaggers 2000).  The first two variables reflect political instability 
and social conflict that may or may not lead to a civil war. Our third variable is an indicator for 
the incidence of civil conflict and our fourth variable works as a proxy for its intensity. The index 
for democracy and autocracy is included to correct for possible underreporting in any of our 
previous four variables in autocratic regimes.  
 
  When  selecting  our  series,  we  are  assuming  that  the  more  complete  the  source  of 
coverage the more likely the data are to reflect the “true” distribution of events. As researchers 
our main concerns are whether different sources provide data that yield the same underlying   7 
structure  among conflict  situations  and  if  these  sources  provide  data  that  lead  to the  same 
substantive conclusions in hypothesis testing and model building (Jackman and Boyd, 1979). 
For  that  reason,  we  will  provide  throughout  our  analysis  robustness  checks  using  different 
dimensions and sources for our data. 
 
  To  combine  the  five  selected  variables  into  a  single  index  for  our  econometric 
estimations we follow Alesina and Perotti (1996) and employ principal components analysis
2 to 
create an index of conflict
3. We use the first principal component of the five variables listed 
above to construct our Conflict Index = 1.34 Assassinations + 1.15 Coups + 0.97 Onset Civil 
War + 0.68 Death in Civil War + 0.84 Autocracy. All the estimated signs are as predicted by the 
theory. Since we standardized all the variables appearing in the index, the order of magnitude of 
the effects of each variable are comparable. The first component explains around 30% of the 
total variance.  
 
  In order to verify the reliability of our conflict index, we precede to some robustness 
checks. The first check consists in introducing sensible variations to the index. We selected five 
variables above to estimate our index. However, Banks (2008) has several other alternative 
variables to measure political instability and conflict. We use these alternative variables (see 
Appendix B for the list) to estimate other versions of the conflict index. In all cases, the expected 
sign  corresponds  to  the  one  predicted  by  the  theory.  In  most  cases,  the  indices  order  the 
countries in the same way and when they do not, the differences are negligible.  
 
  The second robustness check for our conflict index consists in comparing the countries 
rank order with the facts. In section 5, we will focus on the economic effects of conflicts during 
the 1980s. For that reason, we are particularly interested in guaranteeing the quality of the 
conflict index for data of the late 1970s and the 1980s. According to our index, El Salvador, 
Peru, Philippines, Guatemala and Iran were the most conflicted countries during that period. In 
contrast, Cote d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Jordan, Malawi, and Albania were the less conflictive during the 
                                                           
2 See Theil (1971) for a description of the principal components method. 
3  Venieris  and  Gupta  (1986)  and  Gupta  (1990)  construct  similar  indexes  by  applying  the  method  of 
discriminant analysis to a large sample of countries.   8 
1980s  in  our  sample  of  developing  countries.  To  check  for  the  actual  facts,  we  use  the 
Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II (Edited by Ciment, 2006). According to this book, 
all our five top countries suffer from conflict in the 1980s: El Salvador Civil Wars (1970s and 
1980s), Peru Shining Path Rebellion (1970s-1997), Philippines Moro Uprising (1970s-1980s), 
Guatemala Civil War (1970s-1990s), and Iran the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the War with 
Iraq (1980-1988). None of the five less conflict countries in our index suffered major political 
instability during the 1980s. Further, when we estimate the same index using only data for the 
1990s and beginning of 2000s, the ranking significatively changes and once again the top and 
bottom countries corresponds with the narrative in Ciment’s book.   
 
  In section 4 and 5, we will further discuss the robustness of our results to changes in the 
specification of our conflict index. 
 
 
3.  Data and Sample Period 
 
  Our main task will be to look at the effects of conflict across industries in developing 
countries.  For  that  purpose,  we  use  the  Industrial  Statistics  Database  (2003)  of  the  United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). This data is available at the 3-digit level 
of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, revision 2) for about forty years. The 
value added data is only extensively available in the 1980s and therefore we focus on that 
period to keep our sample as large as possible
4.  
 
  We would like to focus on long-term growth and at the same time use the most reliable 
data available. On that basis, our first selection criterion is to include those industrial sectors for 
which we have enough observations to compute the average value added growth rate over at 
least a five-year period in the 1980s. Our aim is to study the effects of conflict on the economic 
structure only in the developing world and for countries that are roughly comparable. For that 
                                                           
4 During the robustness analysis we use data for the 1990s, resulting in a much smaller sample size.   9 
reason, our second selection criterion is to include in our analysis only low-income and low 
middle-income countries. Our cut off is a per capita GDP PPP lower than $7000 (constant 2000 
international  $)  in  1980,  the  first  year  of  our  sample.  Applying  the  two  criteria  reduces  our 
sample to the 50 developing countries in Appendix A. The UNIDO database contains data on 28 
industries in these countries (see the first two columns in Appendix C for a description). 
 
  The rest of the data is standard. The manufacture, agricultural, and service data as a 
share of GDP is from the World Development Indicators (WDI). The forestry volume data and 
the crop index data come from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The data and 
their sources are described in detail in Appendix B. 
 
 
4.  The Effects of Conflict on the Economy: Theory 
 
4.1  The Setting 
 
  In  this  section,  we  present  a  simple  model  of  endogenous  conflict  to  illustrate  the 
plausible channels through which conflict may affect the structure of the economy. We start from 
a  standard  model  of  an  internationally  open  country  with  two  sectors  and  two  factors  of 
production, as described in Jones (1965). Similar to Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2008), we include 
appropriation in this framework. In their model the main effect of appropriation is to reduce the 
available labor endowment. In several respects our framework is complementary to theirs: First, 
their  model  captures  mostly  organized  crime  not  leading to  capital  destruction,  whereas  we 
include  government  and  rebel  contest  as  occurring  in  civil  wars  and  resulting  in  capital 
destruction. Second, while they emphasize the impact of shocks and various policies on the 
intensity of appropriation, our focus lies mostly on generating empirically testable predictions of 
how  conflict  affects  the  structure  of  the  economy.  Thus,  in  contrast  to  Dal  Bo  and  Dal  Bo 
(2008)’s purely theoretical contribution, we allow for various additional channels through which 
conflict matters, which will then guide our empirical strategy. 
   10
There are two sectors, 1 and 2, and two factors of production, capital K and labor L, 
where the total factor endowments are  K , resp.  L . The output prizes are denoted p1, resp. 1 
(p2 is normalized to 1), the factor prizes are r per unit of K and w for a unit of L. The capital and 
labor that is engaged in the sectors 1 and 2, are labeled K1, K2, L1, and L2 respectively. The 
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where a1L, a1K, a2L, a2K are the amounts of production factors required to produce a unit of output 
of the commodities 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Additionally  there  are  two  conflict  activities:  Labor  can  be  spent  for  government 



















where N=rents from natural resources. 
 
The above expression captures the basics of conflict over resource rents.
5 As in Dal Bo 
and Dal Bo (2008) it is assumed that appropriation is labor-intensive. In contrast, however, we 
take  into  account that  a  part  of  capital  is  destroyed  in  conflict. In  particular,  the  disposable 
                                                           
5 N could also be interpreted as some other “prize” to be appropriated, like e.g. foreign aid or ego rents from 
office.   11
income in the presence of conflict becomes  ) ( R G L L K + − µ , where parameter µ  captures how 
capital-destructive conflict is. 
 
All results below would go through if we allowed for a part of production output being 
captured in conflict or if we included particular fighting technologies (such as in Rohner, 2006). 
Further, including capital in the contest success functions or allowing for further forms of labor-
destruction in conflict would not change the qualitative implications of the framework. What is 
crucial for our results is that in conflict both total disposable capital and labor are reduced and 
that in some instances either L or K are relatively more strongly affected. 
 
4.2  The Equilibrium 
 
Exogenously  given  are  the  relative  output  price  p1,  the  production  technology 
parameters a1L, a1K, a2L, a2K, the factor endowments  K  and L , and the natural resource rents N. 
Endogenously derived will be the factor prices r and w, the production and appropriation factor 
allocations K1, K2, L1, L2, LG and LR and the output and appropriation levels Y1, Y2, YG, and YR. 
 
We shall start by characterizing the fighting equilibrium. The first order conditions lead to 
the  following  reaction  functions
6  (note  that  the  labor  opportunity  costs  wLG,  resp.  wLR  are 
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6 The FOC’s for the Nash Equilibrium lead directly to the solution but we follow the literature in showing the 
reaction functions first.    12
The  intersection  of  the  two  reaction  functions  corresponds  to  the  Nash  Equilibrium
7, 
which takes the following values:  ) 4 /(
* * w N L L R G = = . These values feed into the production 
equations.  Now  the  labor  endowment  that  is  disposable  for  production  becomes: 
) 2 /(
* * w N L L L L R G − = − − .  Similarly,  the  capital  available  for  production  becomes 
) 2 /( ) ( ) (
* * w N K L L K R G µ µ − = + − . The following lemma is intuitive: 
 
Lemma 1: Conflict is most intensive (i.e. high LG and LR) in countries with low salaries (i.e. low 
w) and large rents from natural resources (i.e. high N).  
 
Proof: Follows from  0 /
* < ∂ ∂ w L G ,  0 /
* < ∂ ∂ w L R ,  0 /
* > ∂ ∂ N L G ,  0 /
* > ∂ ∂ N L R . 
 
This  is  consistent  with  the  empirical  studies  of the  determinants  of  civil  war  (Collier, 
Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). 
 
We shall initially focus on a competitive production equilibrium with an interior solution 
(i.e. without specialization). Thus, the following conditions have to hold. The zero-profit condition 
implies: 
 
(4)  1 1 1 p wa ra L K = +      ;      1 2 2 = + L K wa ra  
 
The production factors are fully employed when: 
                                                           
7 We focus in the Nash Equilibrium that is the  standard solution in the literature of  conflict when there are 
strategic interactions. However this may not be the only solution as other  sort of  equilibrium constructs are 
possible. For instance, the government might take account of the effects of its own choice on the choice of the 
rebel leader, or vice versa. Also, if conflict is costly and commitment technologies were available, a (cooperative) 
rent sharing equilibrium could be sustainable.   13
 
(5)  ) 2 /( ) ( 2 2 1 1 w N K a Y a Y K K µ − = +      ;      ) 2 /( 2 2 1 1 w N L a Y a Y L L − = +  
 
This leads to following factor prices and output levels: 
 
(6) 
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Introducing w into Y1, resp. Y2 we obtain: 
 
(9) 
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We  shall  now  perform  some  comparative  statics.  Without  loss  of  generality  we  can 
assume that sector 1 is capital-intensive and that a1K> a2K, a1L<a2L. The following intermediate 
result is straightforward: 
 
Lemma 2: An increase in the price of the capital-intensive good p1 increases r, reduces w and 
in this way leads to higher conflict efforts LG, resp. LR. 
 
Proof: The first half of this lemma is simply the well-known Stolper-Samuelson result and follows 
from  0 / 1 > ∂ ∂ p r , resp.  0 / 1 < ∂ ∂ p w  in equation (6). The second half of this lemma follows from 
0 / < ∂ ∂ w LG , resp.  0 / < ∂ ∂ w LR  in equation (3). 
 
A variant of this intermediate result of Lemma 2 is also found in Dal Bo and Dal Bo 
(2008)’s related model of crime. In contrast, the rest of our results presented below are novel, 
and have to the best of our knowledge not been obtained before in the literature. Now, we shall 
analyze whether capital- or labor-intensive sectors suffer most from conflict. 
 
Proposition 1: For moderately destructive conflicts (i.e. low µ) labor-intensive sectors suffer 
most, while in very destructive conflicts (i.e. high µ) capital-intensive sectors are most affected. 
 
Proof: For low levels of µ the reduction in disposable labor prevails, while for large levels of µ 
the decrease in available capital dominates. It follows from equations (9) and (10) that in the 
former case the relative size of the labor-intensive sector 2 shrinks, while in the latter case the 
capital-intensive sector 1 is downsized. 
   15
Empirically,  conflict  is  mostly  capital-destructive  in  rich  countries,  where  fighting 
technologies are more powerful and high-profile targets are readily available.
8 In these countries 
also non-tangible forms of capital like brand names or a reputation for political stability are most 
fragile. This leads to the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 1: Empirically, conflicts in low-income countries are expected to hurt labor-intensive 
sectors  most  extensively,  while  in  high-income  countries  capital-intensive  sectors  are  most 
affected by conflict.  
 
Proof: Follows from Proposition 1. 
 
Interestingly, this is consistent with the empirical evidence that driving forces and effects 
of conflict are very different for rich versus poor countries (Collier and Rohner, 2008). 
 
Next, we shall assess how price changes affect the outputs of the two sectors.  
 
Proposition 2: If conflict is not very destructive (i.e. low µ), a marginal increase in the relative 
price of the capital-intensive commodity, p1, increases the output Y1 of the corresponding sector 
and  decreases  the  output  Y2  of  the  labor-intensive  sector.  In  contrast,  if  conflict  is  very 
destructive  (i.e.  high  µ),  a  marginal  increase  in  p1  decreases  the  output  Y1  of  the  capital-
intensive sector and increases the output Y2 of the labor-intensive sector. 
 
Proof: Follows from equations (9) and (10). If µ is low:  0 / 1 1 > ∂ ∂ p Y ,  0 / 2 1 < ∂ ∂ p Y . In contrast, if 
µ is large:  0 / 1 1 < ∂ ∂ p Y ,  0 / 2 1 > ∂ ∂ p Y . 
                                                           
8 Our findings contrast with Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2008)’s prediction that conflict always harms labor-intensive 
sectors most, which is driven by their assumption that conflict does not reduce the stock of available capital.   16
 
Note that here we focused on marginal changes in relative prices. For larger changes in 
prices  specialization  in  the  production  of  one  single  commodity  can  occur  in  the  underlying 
framework. 
 
The result of Proposition 2 is interesting. The possibility that exogenous price increases 
in  commodity  1  can  reduce  the  output  of  this  same  commodity  may  seem  at  first  sight 
paradoxical. This finding is due to the channel of conflict: An increase in p1 leads to lower wages 
w,  which  reduces  the  opportunity  cost  of  appropriation.  If  conflict  is  very  destructive  the 
disposable capital can be reduced to such an extent that the output of the capital-intensive 
commodity Y1 actually decreases. 
 
4.3  Extensions and Further Comparative Statics  
 
So far we focused on the effects of conflict on sectors of varying factor-intensity. Now we 
shall put emphasis on other empirically relevant aspects of the structure of an economy. For this 
purpose we shall in the following extensions close the factor intensity channel and assume that 
a1K=a2K, a1L=a2L,. In this case, the country will specialize in sector 1 if p1>1, and specialize in 
sector 2 if p1<1. We shall assume that initially p1=1 and no specialization occurs. 
 
In such a setting clearly an increase in p1 will increase the output of commodity 1 by 
triggering  specialization  towards  sector  1.  However,  often,  as  it  was  mentioned  above,  an 
increase  in  the  price  of  the  good  the  countries  specialize  in,  triggers  conflict  because  it 
increases the amount of rents available for grabbing. In the light of this, we can analyze the 
effects of conflict on domestic versus export sectors. To fix ideas, let us assume that sector 1 
produces  an  exported  good,  while  sector  2  produces  exclusively  for  the  domestic  market. 
Countries in civil war are often subject to trade sanctions or export barriers broadly understood
9, 
                                                           
9 During conflict basic infrastructure is damaged or inaccessible, external financing (export credit) scarce, and 
contracts riskier.    17
which makes it harder to export and increase “costs” for a given price level p1, resulting in the 
following empirically testable prediction: 
 
Proposition 3: In a setting with small differences in factor intensities, where price changes 
trigger specialization, export sectors are expected to suffer more from conflict than domestic 
sectors.  
 
Proof: Follows from the discussion above. 
 
Our  simple  framework  can  also  generate  predictions  on  how  the  investment 
requirements  of  sectors  influence  their  vulnerability  in  conflict.  Assume  that  in  sector  1  the 
returns to investment are received with some lag and that future gains are discounted. Initially, 
production takes place in both sectors, with δp1=1. Conflict reduces the discount factor δ of 
future payoffs by decreasing life expectancy. Put differently, as producers know that with some 
positive probability they get killed in conflict they discount future rewards more heavily. This 
leads  to  δp1<1,  which  triggers  specialization  away  from  sector  1  to  sector  2  which  delivers 
immediate gains. This can be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: In a setting with small differences in factor intensities, where price changes 
trigger specialization, sectors that require future investments (i.e. manufacturing, crop farming) 
are expected to suffer most from conflict.  
 
Proof: Follows from the discussion above. 
 
 
5.  The Effects of Conflict on the Economy: Some Stylized Facts 
   18
  The presence of conflict alters the incentives, constraints, and planning time horizons of 
the economies that suffer it.  We are interested in getting some stylized facts of the effects of 
conflict  on  the  economic  structure  of  a  country.  However,  this  task  poses  several  practical 
challenges. The first problem is how to measure conflict. As we mentioned in section 2 of this 
paper, the  variable  is  multidimensional  and  hard  to  pin  down  in  a  numerical  value.  For  the 
purpose of this paper, we are more interested in getting a ranking for conflictive countries than a 
particular meaningful  number.  For that reason, we  decided  to  construct  an  index  of  conflict 
using principal components analysis. 
 
  The second practical problem is that often statistics are the first casualty in a conflict. 
Lacking superior information to those who constructed the data, our only remedy is to work with 
average data over long periods of time, check for outliers, and see if a pattern emerges. We 
also control for country and time effects to try to minimize this difficulty. In the next section, we 
can partially avoid this problem by looking between industries variation instead of the typical 
cross-countries regressions.  
 
  To estimate the effect of conflict on the structure of the economy, we plot the log of the 
variable of interest in a country against the conflict index for two separate dates, after controlling 
for GDP pc PPP, GDP PPP pc square, time and country fixed effects as displayed in equation 
(7) below: 
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  Since  we  include  fixed  effects,  the  association  between  conflict  and  the  dependent 
variable is temporal, within countries, over time, rather than a relationship between countries. 
The dependent variable is the average for 1980-1985, and 2000-2005. For the conflict variable, 
we use our benchmark index from section 2 averaged over 1976-1985, and 1996-2005. We 
include the previous five years in the conflict index estimates to pick up the fact that the current 
configuration of a country may have been very much affected by recent conflicts
10. 
 
                                                           
10 Our main results are not affected if we average the conflict variable over 1966-1985 and 1986-2005.   19
  Our first variable of interest is manufacturing growth. As pointed out by Jones and Olken 
(2008), practically all countries which have had a sustained period of growth in the post-war 
period  have  experienced  a  large  increase  in  their  share  of  manufacturing.  Our  regressions 
results (Table 1, first column) show that increases in the conflict level are associated with a 
reduction  in  the  share  of  manufacture  in  the  GDP.  The  coefficient  estimate  suggests  very 
important  effects:  a  change  in  conflict  from  the  first  quartile  to  the  third  quartile  implies  a 
reduction  in  the  share  of  manufacturing  in  total  GDP  of  about  7  percentage  points.  The 
relationship showed in Figure 1 is robust to different specifications of the conflict index and to 
the removal of the most influential observations. Without further analysis, we do not know if the 
relationship  is  casual.  However,  the  argument  for  reverse  causality  is  unconvincing  -as  the 
country get poorer or the income distribution more unequal and the manufacturing shrinks, it 
become more prone to conflict- because we have controlled for initial per capita GDP. Given the 
importance of manufacturing growth in the development process, we will further study the issue 
in next section. In particular, we will test some possible channels through which conflict affects 
manufacture growth. 
 
  Figures  2  and  3  show  the  relationship  between  conflict  and  agricultural  and  service 
respectively. The estimated coefficients in the second and third columns in Table 1 are not 
significantly different from zero. This result does not change if we use different variations in the 
conflict index or if we check for outliers. These no results are hardly a surprise. Production in the 
agricultural  sector  drops  on  average  by  12.3%  per  year  during  periods  of  violent  conflict
11 
(Messer et al 1998). However, we are measuring agricultural as a share of GDP and given the 
important negative effect we found for the manufacturing sector it may be the case that the 
agricultural  sector  suffers  relatively  less  as  it  is  a  less  complex  and  a  more  vital  activity. 
Furthermore, the argument for reverse causality here is much stronger than in the case of the 
manufacturing  sector. There  are  many  examples  where  issues  within  the  agricultural  sector 
have unquestionably had direct impacts on the outbreak of violent conflict
12. In the case of the 
service sector, the variable is not very informative and we could hardly expect to find any effect 
                                                           
11 Angola is an extreme example, having production drop by as much as 44.5% during the war years from 
1975-1993. 
12 Crisis in the agricultural sector has been cited as a contributing factor to the conflicts in Rwanda and 
Cote d’Ivoire (UNU-IAS, 2004) as well as in over two dozen other conflicts in a direct or indirect fashion 
(de Soysa and Gleditsch, 1999).   20
of conflict as it includes from very complex business services to very simple personal services 
that may be affected in very different ways during conflict. 
 
  The exploitation of natural forests is a very simple economic activity in the development 
world.  For  that  reason,  we  would  expect  conflict  to  increase  the  utilization  of  this  natural 
resource in detriment of more complex activities that required coordination and resources that 
are not available during conflict. The breakdown in cooperation and shortening of time horizons 
may also lead to an overexploitation of this resource since the negative externality may not be 
internalized.  Le  Billlon  (2000)  illustrates  this  in  the  case  of  Cambodia  where  the  forest 
exploitation  for  timber  financed  the  continuation  of  the  civil  war,  leading  to  the  depletion  of 
Cambodia’s most valuable resource. Our estimate (column four in Table 1) shows a positive 
effect of conflict in the forestry production volume (Figure 4). However, conflict in the long run 
may  lead  to  an  abrupt  decrease  in  forestry  production  if  the  overexploitation  depletes  this 
resource.  
  
  More  clear  is  the  effect  conflict  has  in  crops  production  (Figure  5),  one  of  the main 
activities in the development world. This is an activity that requires an investment that takes 
some time to mature. Conflict affects the provision of the infrastructure and financial capital 
required to raise cash crops. It also reduces the planning horizon leading many farmers to focus 
only on subsistence agriculture. It is also a well recorded fact that rebel factions usually target 
crops  producers  to  affect  the  ability  of  the  government  to  raise  revenues  from  the  crops 
commercialization  (Meredith  2005).  Our  estimated  coefficient  in  column  five  of  Table  1  is 
negative and significative. We found the same results when we tried with sensible variations in 
our definition of conflict.  
 
  To sum up, in this section we found that conflict has a sizable negative effect on the 
manufacture share of GDP, while it does not have any evident effect on the share of agriculture 
and the service sector. We also found that activities, such as forestry, that involve a natural 
resource  that  is  easily  sizable  increase  during  conflict,  while  other  activities  that  require 
investment decrease in the presence of conflict. In the next section, we explore in more detail 
the effects of conflict on the manufacturing sector.   21
 
 
6. Conflict and Production Structure: The Channels   
 
  The manufacture share in GDP declines with conflict, but what are the deep underlying 
causes? To answer this question, we use the methodology developed in Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) to test channels through which conflict may have an effect on the production structure. 
This  methodology  moves  away  from  the  between  countries  differences  of  cross-countries 
regressions  where  endogeneity  is  a  big  concern  to  within  countries  between  industries 
differences. However, to be valid, this methodology needs “technology” to be similar among the 
countries being compared, and for that reason, we decided to focus on developing countries.  
 
  In the model of the previous section, we suggested that conflict may affect to the largest 
extent those productive sectors that are most complex, and require most intermediate inputs 
and coordination among different agents in the economy. We would like to check this by looking 
whether  industries  that  might  be  most  affected  by  a  channel  grow  differentially  in  countries 
where the channel is likely to be more operative (countries where conflict is more extensive). 
Therefore, our estimation strategy is to run regressions of the form: 
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  Our dependent variable is the real annual average value added growth of industry i in 
country j during the 1980s, the period for which our sample is larger and the value added data 
more reliable. The explanatory variables include the initial period share of industry i in total 
value added in country j, country and industry fixed effects, and the interaction term between the 
country-specific  conflict  level  and  the  industry-specific  characteristics  through  which  the 
channels operate. Our focus is the coefficient β associated with this interaction term.  
   22
  We have to define now the industry characteristics that we shall use to test the effects of 
conflict. We are interested in three different groups of industry characteristics: (i) Institutional 
Complexity
13, (ii) Production Factor Intensity, and (iii) Exportability. 
 
(i)  Institutional Complexity 
 
  We expect industries that are transaction intensive, and require complex contracting and 
specific inputs to rely more on the institutional environment in which they operate. Therefore, 
they should be the most affected during conflict because of the effect it has on the general 
quality of the country’s institutions and policies. 
 
  To  estimate  the  channels,  we  use  two  different  measures  developed  using  the  US 
economy as a benchmark. Both measures use the Input Output matrix of the US economy to 
obtain the level of institutional complexity of industry i. The first industry characteristic we use is 
the “relation specific investment” measure developed by Nunn (2007). He asks whether or not 
the  input  is  sold  in  an  organized  exchange  (thick  market)  and  for  each  industry  he  gets  a 
measure of the proportion of its intermediate goods that are relationship-specific. The second 
industry  measure  is  a  Herfindahl  index  of  the  intermediate  good  requirements  from  other 
industries. This measure was first used by Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and later by Cowan 
and Neut (2007) and the idea is that the fewer the industries an industry buys from the less it 
needs institutional quality. The assumption behind this approach is that the existing structure of 
intermediate good use in the US is driven by technology differences across sectors, and that 
these technological differences persist across economies (Cowan and Neut, 2007). The first two 
columns in Appendix C show these measures for the 28 industries. 
 
  We  then  move  to  estimate  equation  (8)  using  our  two  measures  of  industry-specific 
institutional complexity. The results appear in the first two columns in Table 2 where the industry 
and country fixed effect coefficients have been removed for presentation simplicity. The two 
                                                           
13 Which is what Collier (1999) calls “transaction intensive” sectors.   23
estimated coefficients are negative as expected: industries that are more “institutions intensive” 
suffer more during conflict. This result is in line with the findings of Collier (1999). Our first 
institutional complexity proxy, the relation specificity variable, is significantly different from zero 
when we use our benchmark conflict index, while the second proxy, the Herfindhal index is not.  
 
  To check for the robustness of our result, we use different specifications for our conflict 
index, in line with what we did in the previous section. In all cases, the estimated coefficients 
remain negative for both proxies, significantly different from zero for the relationship specificity 
variable, and for some cases now the Herfindhal variable becomes significantly different from 
zero.  A  second  source  of  concern  is  the  possibility  that  our  results  are  driven  by  omitted 
country-level variables that are correlated with the conflict index and have a differential effect 
across industries. The main candidate for this omitted variable is official aid. Conflict countries 
often  receive  post-conflict  aid  to  help  rebuild  their  economies.  It  is  a  well  documented  fact 
(Rajan and Subramanian, 2005) that aid has a negative effect on governance and therefore 
affects  more  those  industries  that  are  governance/institution  intense.  To  control  for  this 
possibility, we include interactions of our complexity variable with the amount of aid (as a share 
of GDP) the country received during the 1980s. The introduction of this term results in negligible 
changes in our previous estimates.    
 
 
(ii)  Production Factor Intensity 
 
  Conflict generally affects the price and availability of inputs required in the production 
process. Physical capital is destroyed and the investment rates remain low during conflict. Wars 
and confrontations kill and displace people. Skilled workers often leave the country and part of 
the  labor force  becomes  part  of government  and  rebels  armies.  Financial  capital  often  also 
leaves  the  country  reducing  the  availability  of  credit  to  finance  working  capital  and  large 
operations. 
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  To study these channels, we characterize industries according to their factor intensity. 
The first measure we use is the logarithm of the capital labor relation that Cowan and Neut 
(2007) estimate using US data to construct a measure of the factor intensity for each industry. 
Our  second  measure  is  the  labor  share  values  from  Rajan  and  Subramanian  (2005).  They 
estimate  the  labor  factor  intensity  as  the  wage  to  value  added  for  each  industry  across 
developing  countries  during  the  1980s.  Our  last  measure  of  factor  intensity  is  the  financial 
dependence  variable  in  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998).  This  variable  measures  the  external 
financial dependence for all firms in industry i during the 1980s. Columns 3-5 in Appendix C 
show these three industry-specific variables. 
 
  We  once  again  estimate  equation  (8)  using  the  three  industry  specific  variables 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. The estimates (columns 3 to 5 in Table 2) show that 
conflicts have a larger negative effect on value added growth in those sectors that are more 
labor intensive and that depend more on external financing. Specifically, we find the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term between conflict and labor intensity and between conflict and 
financial dependence to be negative in the three cases and significantly different from zero in 
the cases of the labor intensity and external financial dependence variables. This last result is 
not surprising; conflicts are often associated to major disruptions in domestic capital markets 
and capital flights. In contrast, the finding that labor and not capital intense sectors suffer more 
during conflict goes against previous findings (Collier, 1999). This is a result that requires more 
study and probably a more disaggregate study at the country-conflict specific level.  A possible 
explanation could be that civil conflicts are labor intensive  in the developing world and that 
physical capital is less mobile than labor in the short run
14. 
 
  We carry out several robustness checks. Our basic results are not affected by sensible 
variations in our conflict index. The estimate of β could be biased due to a combination of cross-
sector differences in factor intensity and cross-country differences in relative factor prices that 
are correlated with conflict. Unfortunately, it is hard to find good proxies for factor prices in 
                                                           
14  Conflicts  in  the  developing  world  are  often  characterized  by  important  loss  of  lives  and  the 
displacement of large parts of the population.   25
developing  countries.  We  use  different  measures  of  financial  development
15  under  the 
assumption that poorly-developed financial markets imply higher effective costs of capital and 
that  firms  in  those  countries  substitute  capital  for  labor.  The  introduction  of  the  financial 





  Further, we are interested in assessing whether “exporting” industries suffer more or less 
from conflict. We use two industry-specific measures developed by Rajan and Subramanian 
(2005). The first measure of exportability consists in the average ratio of export to value added 
across developing countries during the 1980s. The second measure is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if the industry i had a ratio of exports to value added above the industry median 
value during the 1980s. The last two columns in Appendix C display the values of these two 
measures across the 28 industries. 
 
  The last two columns in Table 2 show the estimates of equation (8) for the exportability 
variables. In both cases, the coefficients are negative and highly significantly different from zero, 
indicating that exporting sectors suffer more during conflict. This result is robust and it is not 
affected by prudent variations in our conflict index. 
   
  This result does not come as a surprise since there is wealth of anecdotic evidence of 
conflicts  were  rebels  target  activities  that  are  the  main  source  of  export  revenue  for  the 
government, like coffee in Colombia or oil in the Nigerian delta. Exporting sectors also require 
advance financing and infrastructure, two sectors that are often affected by conflict. However, 
                                                           
15 We approximate financial development using the extensive set of indices found in the World Bank’s 
Financial Development and Structure database. However, data is not available for all the countries in our 
sample and therefore we lose some observations when we do this robustness check.   26
the result could also have gone the other way around, since the government may stimulate 
exporting sectors during conflict to obtain extra revenue for distributive or defense purposes.  
 
  Our estimates could also be biased due to endogeneity issues. Higher export growth 
may generate additional rents to fight for or commodity price collapses may increase poverty, 
which could fuel conflict. The bias could go either way and we do not have data available to 
disentangle the two effects. The correlation between a country specific commodity export price 
index
16 and our conflict index is very low. The introduction of this extra interaction term in (8) 
does not affect our previous results. 
 
  To  summarize,  the  reduction  in  manufacturing  share  in  conflict  countries  can  be 
explained by several channels. In this section, we found evidence that conflict affects more 
industries that require good institutions, are labor intensive, need external financing, and export 
an  important  part  of  their  production.  These  results  are  robust  to  sensible  variations  in  our 




7. Conclusions   
 
  Most  of  the  literature  on  civil  wars  focuses  on  its  causes.  The  present  contribution 
instead looks at the effects of conflict on the structure of the economy. We develop an index of 
conflict using principal component analysis and apply it to assess the effects of conflict across 
economic activities in a sample of developing countries. 
 
  We find that conflict reduces the share of the manufacturing sector in the GDP, which 
may have important effects on the developing path of these countries. In contrast, in particular 
                                                           
16 The commodity export price index comes from Collier and Goderis (2007)   27
those associated to natural resources, are likely to be over-exploited during conflict leading in 
the long run to environmental degradation and increasing poverty. We do not find conclusive 
evidence on the effect of conflict on the agricultural and service share of GDP. 
 
  Using industrial level data for a sample of developing countries in the 1980s, we find that 
industries that are more institutional, labor, and external finance intensive are the most affected 
by  conflict.  Exporting  sectors  also  suffer  from  war.  These  results  are  robust  to  sensible 
variations in our conflict index and to several checks for omitted variables bias. 
 
  While we could not rule out the possibility that our results are driven by defective and 
incomplete  data, the  use  of  inappropriate  proxies,  or  by  other  omitted  variables,  the results 
provide a benchmark for future studies. This is one of the first papers to look systematically at 
the economic effects of conflict and further work is needed. In particular, we came around the 
problem of defining conflict using an index, but this could and should be improved trying to 
disaggregate different dimensions of conflict such as duration, intensity, location and motivation. 
Some of the industry characteristics used to estimate the channels were based on US data that 
may  not  be  relevant  for  developing  countries  and  alternative  proxies  should  be  considered.  
Future  work  should  also  consider  strategies  to  instrument  for  conflict  and  ways  to  take  the 
analysis to the country case study level.   28
Appendix A: List of Countries in the Sample 
Albania  Cote d'Ivoire  Jamaica  Papua New Guinea 
Algeria  Dominican Republic  Jordan  Peru 
Bangladesh  Ecuador  Kenya  Philippines 
Bolivia  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Lesotho  Senegal 
Botswana  El Salvador  Madagascar  Sri Lanka 
Burundi  Ethiopia  Malawi  Syrian Arab Republic 
Cameroon  Fiji  Malaysia  Togo 
Central African Rep.   Ghana  Mauritius  Turkey 
Chile  Guatemala  Morocco  Uruguay 
China  Honduras  Nicaragua  Venezuela, RB 
Colombia  India  Nigeria  Zimbabwe 
Congo, Rep.  Indonesia  Pakistan   
Costa Rica  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Panama     29
Macroeconomic Variables Source 
Manufacture as % of GDP World Development Indicators
Agriculture as % of GDP World Development Indicators
Service as % of GDP World Development Indicators
Crop Index Food and Agricultural Organization
Foretry Production Volume Food and Agricultural Organization
Population  World Development Indicators
GDP Per Capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $)  World Development Indicators
Industry Level Data
Variables in the Conflict Index
Number of politically motivated murder of government officials Banks (2008)
Number of coups Banks (2008)
Dummy for war onsets Gleditsch et al (2002)
Number of death in civil wars  Gleditsch et al (2002)
Autocracy/Democracy scores (0 to 10) Polity IV
Alternative Variables in the Conflict Index
Number of general strikes with more than 1000 people involved Banks (2008)
Number of armed activity, sabotage etc in the aim of overthrowing government Banks (2008)
Number of government crisis Banks (2008)
Number of systematic purges of opposition Banks (2008)
Number of violant demonstration involving more than 100 people Banks (2008)
Number of anti-government demonstrations Banks (2008)
Number of attempted revolutions Banks (2008)
Number of major constitutional changes Banks (2008)
Dummy for coups Banks (2008)
Rajan and Subramanian (2005)
Rajan and Subramanian (2005)
Rajan and Zingales (1998)
Rajan and Subramanian (2005)
Cowan and Neut (2007)
Blanchard and Kremer (1997) Herfindahl Index of Intermediate good requirements from other industries
Log K/L: US data to construct factor intensity for each industry
Labor share: wage to value added for each industry across developing countries 
during the 1980s.
Financial Dependence: measure of external financial dependence for all firms in 
industry i during the 1980s
Exportability in the 1980s: average ratio of export to value added across 
developing countries
Exportability dummy: takes value 1 if industry i has a ratio of exports to value 
added above the industry median value 
Growth Rate of Value Addedij: Industry i's annual growth rate of value added in 
country j, averaged over each decade
UNIDO (2003)
Initial Industry Shareij: Industry i's in country j total manufacturing value added at 
the beginning of each decade
UNIDO (2003)
Appendix B: Data Sources and Description
Relation specific investment: for each industry get measure of the proportion of 
its intermediate goods that are relationship-specific
Nunn (2007)  30
 
Appendix C: Industry Level Indexes 
ISIC Description Relation Specific HH Institutional LogK/L  Labor Share'80s External Finance Exporability Exportability
Investment Intensity (Negative) Dependence in the 1980s Dummy
311 Food products 0.331 -0.497 -1.028 0.360 0.140 1.250 1
313 Beverages 0.713 -0.794 -1.205 0.260 0.080 0.140 0
314 Tobacco 0.317 -1.519 -1.199 0.240 -0.450 0.230 0
321 Textiles 0.376 -1.049 -0.934 0.470 0.400 1.350 1
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.745 -1.232 -0.567 0.510 0.030 2.460 1
323 Leather products 0.571 -1.488 -0.726 0.450 -0.140 2.650 1
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 0.650 -1.825 -0.627 0.490 -0.080 1.690 1
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.516 -1.156 -0.899 0.470 0.280 1.240 1
332 Furniture, except metal 0.568 -0.462 -0.742 0.500 0.240 0.460 0
341 Paper and products 0.348 -0.983 -1.159 0.390 0.180 0.360 0
342 Printing and publishing 0.713 -0.907 -0.830 0.510 0.200 0.130 0
351 Industrial chemicals 0.240 -1.761 -1.260 0.350 N/A 1.810 1
352 Other chemicals 0.490 -0.586 -1.227 0.360 0.220 0.790 0
353 Petroleum refineries 0.058 -4.160 -1.575 0.190 0.040 2.150 1
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.395 -1.492 -1.093 0.300 0.330 16.770 1
355 Rubber products 0.407 -0.545 -0.995 0.420 0.230 0.610 0
356 Plastic products 0.408 -1.366 -0.923 0.360 1.140 0.460 0
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0.329 -0.560 -0.828 0.460 -0.150 1.030 0
362 Glass and products 0.557 -0.703 -1.081 0.440 0.530 0.660 0
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.377 -0.467 -1.081 0.370 0.060 0.250 0
371 Iron and steel 0.242 -0.810 -1.272 0.380 0.090 0.810 0
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.160 -0.668 -1.147 0.330 0.010 3.520 1
381 Fabricated metal products 0.435 -0.847 -0.949 0.450 0.240 0.480 0
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.764 -0.352 -0.980 0.510 0.450 1.390 1
383 Machinery, electric 0.740 -0.533 -0.942 0.380 0.770 1.050 0
384 Transport equipment 0.859 -0.549 -1.015 0.470 0.310 2.680 1
385 Professional & scientific equipment 0.785 -0.383 -0.881 0.430 0.960 6.880 1
390 Other manufactured products 0.547 -0.450 -0.828 0.430 0.470 2.570 1  31
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Table 1: Conflict and Economic Activities       
           
   Manufacture/GDP  Agriculture/GDP  Service/GDP  Forestry/Population 
Crop 
Index 
                 
GDP pc PPP  12.50  -13.37  -27.23  73.95  37.66* 
  (0.42)  (0.89)  (-1.61)  (1.58)  (1.99) 
           
GDP pc PPP sq  -6.234  6.428  13.70  -36.99  -18.79* 
  (-0.41)  (-0.86)  (1.62)  (-1.58)  (-1.99) 
           
Conflict  -0.0978*  -0.0711  0.0649  0.230*  -0.109* 
  (-1.66)  (1.28)  (1.38)  (1.87)  (-1.73) 
                 
Number 
Observations  92  95  95  97  98 
R-square  0.877  0.964  0.800  0.957  0.788 
           
T-values reported below the coefficient, standard errors are robust, ***, **, * denote significance at,    
or below, 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.        
All regressions include country and time fixed effects, not reported for presentation simplicity.   
See text for definitions of variables.         
   35
Table 2: Impact of Conflict on the Production Structure
Dependent variable is the annual average rate of real value added growth of industry (i) in country (j) during the 1980s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Initial industry share (ij) -0.130** -0.131** -0.134** -0.132** -0.0973** -0.133** -0.129**
(-2.47) (-2.51) (-2.55) (-2.51) (-2.00) (-2.55) (-2.47)
Conflict Index (j)*Relationship Specificity(i) -0.0107*
(-1.67)
Conflict Index (j)*Institutional Intensity HH(i) -0.00135
(-0.73)
Conflict Index (j)*Labor Intensity(i) -0.0124**
(-1.96)
Conflict Index (j)*Average Labor Share in 1980s(i) -0.0208
(-1.19)
Conflict Index (j)*External Financial Dependence(i) -0.00797*
(-1.80)
Conflict Index (j)*Exportability Index(i) in 1980s -0.00196***
(-4.65)
Conflict Index (j)*Exportability Dummy in 1980s -0.00634**
(-2.15)
Number of observations 1372 1372 1372 1372 1323 1372 1372
R-Squared 0.259 0.257 0.259 0.258 0.268 0.260 0.268
T-values reported below the coefficient, standard errors are robust, ***, **, * denote significance at, or below, 1, 5, and 10 percen respectively. 
All regressions include industry and country fixed effects, not reported for presentation simplicity. See text for definitions of variables.
Institutional Complexity Production Factor Intensity Exportability  36
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This graph represents the conditional relationship between the change in the average size of 
the manufacturing sector between 1980-1985 and 2000-2005 in a country and the change in the 
conflict index between 1976-1985 and 1996-2005. It is based on running a panel regression for 
our sample of 50 developing countries where the dependent variable is the log of the share of 
manufacturing value added in the GDP for a country in the early 1980s and early 2000s, and the 
explanatory  variables  are  the  country’s  per  capita  PPP  GDP,  per  capita  PPP  GDP  square, 
country and time fixed effects, and our benchmark conflict index from section 2 of the paper 
estimated around the 1980s and the 2000s. The relationship between conflict and manufacture 
growth is negative, significative, and robust to sensible variations in our conflict index.   37
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This graph represents the conditional relationship between the change in the average size of 
the agricultural sector between 1980-1985 and 2000-2005 in a country and the change in the 
conflict index between 1976-1985 and 1996-2005. It is based on running a panel regression for 
our sample of 50 developing countries where the dependent variable is the log of the share of 
agricultural value added in the GDP for a country in the early 1980s and early 2000s, and the 
explanatory  variables  are  the  country’s  per  capita  PPP  GDP,  per  capita  PPP  GDP  square, 
country and time fixed effects, and our benchmark conflict index from section 2 of the paper 
estimated around the 1980s and the 2000s. The relationship between conflict and agriculture 
value  added  growth  is  not  significative.  Sensible  variations  in  our  conflict  index  generate 
different results (12 negative and 4 positive coefficients) that are never significative.   38
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This graph represents the conditional relationship between the change in the average size of 
the  service  sector  between  1980-1985  and  2000-2005  in  a  country  and  the  change  in  the 
conflict index between 1976-1985 and 1996-2005. It is based on running a panel regression for 
our sample of 50 developing countries where the dependent variable is the log of the share of 
service value added in the GDP for a country in the early 1980s and early 2000s, and the 
explanatory  variables  are  the  country’s  per  capita  PPP  GDP,  per  capita  PPP  GDP  square, 
country and time fixed effects, and our benchmark conflict index from section 2 of the paper 
estimated around the 1980s and the 2000s. The relationship between conflict and service value 
added  growth  is  not  significative.  Sensible  variations  in  our  conflict  index  generate  different 
results (7 negative and 9 positive coefficients) that are never significative.   39
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This graph represents the conditional relationship between the change in the average size of 
the forestry production volume between 1980-1985 and 2000-2005 in a country and the change 
in  the  conflict  index  between  1976-1985  and  1996-2005.  It  is  based  on  running  a  panel 
regression for our sample of 50 developing countries where the dependent variable is the log of 
the ratio of forestry production volume to the population of a country in the early 1980s and early 
2000s, and the explanatory variables are the country’s per capita PPP GDP, per capita PPP 
GDP square, country and time fixed effects, and our benchmark conflict index from section 2 of 
the paper estimated around the 1980s and the 2000s. The relationship between conflict and 
forestry production volume growth is positive and significative in most cases. Sensible variations 
in our conflict index generate different results (14 positive and 2 negative coefficients). The 
positive coefficients are significative in 13 out of 14 cases. The negative coefficients are not 
significative.   40
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This graph represents the conditional relationship between the change in the crop production 
index between 1980-1985 and 2000-2005 in a country and the change in the conflict index 
between 1976-1985 and 1996-2005. It is based on running a panel regression for our sample of 
50 developing countries where the dependent variable is the log of the crop production index of 
a country in the early 1980s and early 2000s, and the explanatory variables are the country’s 
per capita PPP GDP, per capita PPP GDP square, country and time fixed effects, and our 
benchmark  conflict  index  from  section  2  of  the  paper  estimated  around  the  1980s  and  the 
2000s. The relationship between conflict and crop production growth is always negative and 
significative. Sensible variations in our conflict index confirm this result. 
 
 
 
 